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Re-Evaluating Turnover/Gross
Receipts Taxes: Their Myths
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of Law in the NYU LL.M. Program in
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A gross receipts or turnover tax is levied every time a good or service “turns
over”—that is, transferred from one entity to another for a consideration; the
resulting gross receipt is subject to tax. The tax base is “turnover”; the measure
of the tax is “gross receipts.”
The tax applies to business-to-business sales of supplies, inventory, machinery,
materials, and other business inputs. It applies to sales to end users. Both business
and personal services are taxed, whether they are business inputs or provided to
end users.
A turnover tax makes no pretense of taxing profits, income, consumption,
wealth, or other bases that have come to be accepted as legitimate around the
world.1 Instead, it taxes business activity. The tax has no connection or relationship
with a firm’s benefits from government spending, or the costs it imposes on society.
In contrast to a turnover tax, a retail sales tax is intended to tax consumption.
Consumption refers to the use of goods and services by individuals for their own
personal satisfaction and not for investment or for further production or use
in a trade or business. Examples of consumption are the purchases of clothing,
shoes, jewelry, furniture, appliances, food, art, cars, boats, liquor, cigarettes, and
the like—provided these do not constitute business inputs. A properly designed
retail sales tax should apply only to the end user, that is, the last person in the
chain of production and distribution. The end users are the consumers purchasing the goods for their own satisfaction. Such a retail sales tax would reach all
purchases for consumption and exempt all business inputs and investments, such
as purchases for resale, like inventory.2
A well-designed retail sales tax, regardless of whether its legal incidence is on
the vendor or the consumer—see below—is intended to reach only consumption.
The vendor is the tax collector and is not intended to be a taxpayer. The economic
© 2022 R.D. Pomp
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burden of the tax should be on the consumer, who, being
the end user, cannot pass it along to anyone else.
Confusion about the meaning of a gross receipts tax
sometimes arises because there are two major ways of
levying a retail sales tax. The first is to impose the legal
incidence of the tax on the purchaser, measured by the sales
price of the transaction. This is known as a consumer-based
sales tax. The second is to impose the legal incidence of the
tax on the vendor, measured by its gross receipts.3 This is
known as a vendor-based sales tax. Because the base of the
tax under this second approach is gross receipts, it can be
confused with a gross receipts tax that is intended to be a
turnover tax. (The base of the tax under the first approach
is indirectly gross receipts because it is the aggregation of
the sales prices of the sales transactions.) Both of these will
be referred to as gross receipts sales taxes.

Confusion about the meaning of a
gross receipts tax sometimes arises
because there are two major ways
of levying a retail sales tax. The first
is to impose the legal incidence of
the tax on the purchaser, measured
by the sales price of the transaction.
The second is to impose the legal
incidence of the tax on the vendor,
measured by its gross receipts.

A gross receipts sales tax and a turnover tax are fundamentally different. For this reason, this Article sometimes
uses the term “turnover tax” to distinguish it from a “gross
receipts sales tax.” It uses the term “retail sales tax” to
embrace both a vendor-based sales tax and a consumerbased sales tax. It also uses the terms “gross receipts taxes”
and “turnover taxes” interchangeably where there is no
risk of confusion.
A retail sales tax does have one thing in common with
a turnover tax: the starting point of each is gross receipts,
and in the case of a turnover tax, that should be the ending
point as well (but as a practical matter it often is not).4 In
contrast, a retail sales tax, whether imposed on the vendor
or the consumer, will embrace common exemptions for
26
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purchases for resale, for ingredients and components that
will become part of another good or service, and for the
purchase of goods or services used in manufacturing.5
These exemptions are intended to eliminate the tax on a
subset of business inputs, which do not constitute consumption because they are not sold to the end user. These
are intermediate goods, known as business inputs because
they are sold to other businesses for use by them in their
further production and distribution. A turnover tax lacks
these types of exemptions because it is not intended to be
limited to consumption.

II. The Case Against Turnover Taxes:
The Reality
A. Cascading6
A turnover tax is intended to tax each transaction in the
chain of production and distribution. For example, the
tax would be applied to the sale of seeds to a farmer who
uses those to grow wheat, to the sale of that wheat by the
farmer to the miller who produces flour, to the sale of that
flour by the miller to the baker for producing bread, and
to the sale by the baker of that bread to an end user, the
customer. Similarly, the sale of raw materials to a manufacturer that incorporates it into a component, the sale
by the manufacturer of that component to an assembler
that incorporates it into a finished product, the sale by the
assembler of the finished product to a distributor, the sale
by the distributor of the finished product to the retailer,
and the sale by the retailer of the finished product to the
end user would all be taxable. The tax at each stage would
be built into the price of the good that would be sold at
the next stage and would be taxed again. This tax on a tax
on a tax on a tax and so forth is known as “cascading” and
increases the effective tax rate above, and often well-above
the statutory rate.
To be sure, a sales tax that does not exempt all business
inputs shares this cascading problem, but to a lesser extent
than in a turnover tax. A well-designed sales tax would
tax only the sale by the retailer to the ultimate end user,
which would eliminate cascading. As a practical matter,
sales taxes reach some business inputs, which creates a
cascading problem.
As each turnover occurs, the tax is likely shifted to the
purchaser. In theory, the turnover tax might not be fully
passed forward to consumers; instead, wages and benefits
might be decreased, the number of jobs might be reduced,
there could be increased resistance to price increases by
vendors, or dividends could be cut. But there is some
Spring 2022

empirical support for the forward shifting of the tax to
consumers.7
If there are multiple turnovers as in the examples
above, the tax is levied multiple times, and is built into
the price of the good at each stage, assuming that it is
passed forward. What starts off as a modest tax can easily
cascade into a substantial one. A study of the Washington
B&O turnover tax, for example, determined that because
of cascading the effective tax rate was 1.5 to 6.5 times
the statutory rate. A study of the now-repealed Indiana
turnover tax, known (misleadingly) as a gross income tax,
calculated that cascading generated effective tax rates as
high as 32%.8
One of the ways a turnover tax tries to address cascading
is through rates that are much lower than those found in
typical retail sales taxes.9 Moreover, to take into account
the varying profit margins of different types of transactions, some turnover taxes have multiple rates, with low
rates being imposed on high-volume, low-profit transactions or those that occur early in the production and
distribution process.

B. A Turnover Tax Can Be a Heavy
Burden on Loss Corporations

Even the common use of multiple rates in some turnover
taxes cannot avoid the tax being paid by businesses operating at a loss, which describes many startups and small
firms. During downturns in the economy when businesses
might have losses, the turnover tax will continue to be
exacted. Those who feel that all businesses should contribute to the costs or benefits of government might laud
this, but certainly not those that have no profits but yet a
tax burden that could be onerous and maybe confiscatory,
especially for a new business.

C. The Tax Can Be Especially Harsh for
High-Volume, Low-Margin Businesses

A turnover tax can be especially harsh, and perhaps
confiscatory, for high-volume, low-margin businesses,
despite the attempt to use multiple rates to deal with this
consequence. For a high-volume, low-margin business
that has razor-thin profits, a turnover tax can well exceed
its profits. Are such businesses common? According to
Jeff Bezos, “[t]here are two ways to build a successful
company. One is to work very, very hard to convince
customers to pay high margins. The other is to work
very, very hard to be able to afford to offer customers
low margins.”10 The latter, of course, is Amazon’s business
model, and presumably also of those that compete with
it, such as Walmart.
Spring 2022

D. Uneven Treatment of Competitors

A turnover tax creates an uneven playing field among
competitors producing the “same” goods. The tax burden
is a function of how the good was produced. The more
business inputs that are purchased in the marketplace
to produce the final good, the more the tax cascades
and is buried in the price of each transaction. The tax
becomes not only a levy on the sales price of the good
to the end user but also an embedded invisible tax
reflecting how the good was produced. Two competitors selling essentially fungible products can bear very
different tax burdens.

E. Heavy Burden on Capital-Intensive
Industries

A turnover tax falls heavily on capital-intensive industries and processes. The tax applies to the purchase
of capital goods, such as land, buildings, machinery,
equipment, construction vehicles, and the like, thereby
discouraging investment. It falls heavily on highvolume, low-margin businesses, and loss corporations
like startups. A leading economist puzzled over why a
legislator would accept these features of a turnover tax:
“[i]t is hard to understand why a state that is worried
about investment and job creation would adopt such a
perverse policy.”11

A turnover tax can be especially
harsh, and perhaps confiscatory,
for high-volume, low-margin
businesses, despite the attempt to
use multiple rates to deal with this
consequence.

This feature of a turnover tax encourages the substitution
of labor for capital, which might seem to be desirable. But
if the status quo ante were the most desirable and efficient
organization and structure, any tax-induced change would
result in a less desirable allocation of resources and possibly reduce a state’s growth. If a turnover tax attempts to
minimize this problem by exempting business inputs, it
becomes more like a retail sales tax and loses its simplicity
and ease of administration, which are some of the alleged
virtues of the tax.
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One study about Canada’s adoption of a value-added
tax (VAT) estimated that annual investments in machinery and equipment rose 12% following the adoption
of that tax, which removed the tax on business inputs
previously imposed by the sales taxes that it replaced.12
Although this study was done in the context of moving
from a retail sales tax to a VAT, the conclusion should
apply even more forcefully in the context of moving away
from a turnover tax, which taxes even more business
inputs than a sales tax.

F. Encourages Inefficient Economic
Integration and Unfair Competition

To reduce the burden of a turnover tax, taxpayers are pressured to engage in strategies that are in their self-interests,
but that undercut the economy. To start, taxpayers can
minimize the cascading effect and gain an advantage over
their competitors by purchasing their suppliers or merging with them. This tax-minimization strategy is known
as “economic integration” and has been condemned by
economists for more than a hundred years.13
From a taxpayer’s perspective, one major advantage of
economic integration is that it avoids the turnover tax
that would otherwise have been paid on the purchase of
business inputs from third parties. Integration avoids the
turnover tax because the taxpayer would now produce
the business inputs in-house, free of the turnover tax
that previously would have applied. Consequently, the
amount of tax that would have otherwise been embedded in the goods produced by the taxpayer is reduced,
giving the taxpayer an advantage over its non-integrated
competitors.
Economic integration is more available to large entities
and thus discriminates against their smaller competitors.
Businesses that integrate will have a lower effective tax
rate over their non-integrated competitors. A firm that is
not integrated will find it hard to shift a turnover tax to
its customers because of the competition with its larger,
integrated competitors. A small business that buys its
inventory from a wholesaler will have difficulty competing against larger, integrated businesses that brought
their wholesalers in-house by merging with them. These
integrated businesses can purchase directly from the
manufacturer and save the profit that otherwise would
have accrued to the wholesaler.
From a broader economic perspective, however, integration imposes a severe problem that undercuts the
economy. If businesses are integrating only to reduce their
turnover taxes, the result is economic inefficiency. That
is, if integration made good business sense independent
28
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of the turnover tax, it should have already occurred. That
would have been the most efficient form of organization
and structure and would thus have been in the interests
of both the taxpayer and the state. In contrast, if integration is occurring solely because of the turnover tax, then
the resulting organization is, by definition, less efficient
and imposes what economists call a “dead weight loss”
on the economy.14

G. Discourages Replacing Old Assets
with New Assets

The sale of old equipment or machinery is subject to a
turnover tax. The purchase of replacement equipment or
machinery will also be taxed. Consequently, modernizing
a plant would incur this double tax—once on the sale of
the old equipment and again on the purchase of the new
equipment. It is hard to imagine that a legislature would
purposely endorse this multiple taxation at a time when
states are using a panoply of tax incentives to encourage
manufacturing and related activities.

H. Encourages Shifting Purchases to
Out-of-State or Foreign Vendors

A turnover tax has other serious effects on the economy
even if no economic integration occurs. A turnover tax
provides an incentive to taxpayers to shift purchases from
in-state vendors to out-of-state suppliers. Goods produced
in other states (or abroad) will not have been subject to a
turnover tax,15 unlike competing goods produced locally.
The out-of-state goods will have had no turnover tax
embedded in their sales price, but locally produced goods
will. The more highly processed the goods, the greater the
difference in price.
Consequently, local businesses will have trouble competing with vendors abroad or those based in other states.
Foreign countries, including China, and the rest of the
Pacific Rim, have VATs, which are refunded on goods sold
to purchasers in other countries, that is, on exports. No
refund can occur for the turnover tax for the simple reason
that the amount of the hidden, cascaded, embedded tax
cannot be easily determined. One economist speculated
that the inability to fully compete with out-of-state vendors can result in lower wages or lost jobs.16

I. Encourages Businesses to Convert
from Wholesalers/Distributors to
Commission Agents
Putting aside the question of integration, another strategy
is for wholesalers or distributors that would otherwise
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have taken title to a good for resale to instead transform
themselves into commission agents. The turnover tax that
would otherwise have applied to the purchase of a good by
a distributor would now be replaced by a smaller turnover
tax on a commission. If the commission is equal to the
amount of profit that would otherwise have occurred,
a tax advantage is achieved for the former wholesaler/
distributor.

J. Encourages Restructuring to Take
Advantage of Lower Rates

Some turnover taxes incorporate multiple rates.
Washington’s B&O tax, for example, has more than 30
rates17 in a quixotic attempt to reduce cascading and
inject some equity into an inherently inequitable tax.
Unfortunately, besides being pollyannaish,18 multiple
rates encourage yet another tax minimization strategy.
Unless a state has measures anticipating and preventing
this strategy, businesses are encouraged to re-organize
themselves to ensure that most of their activities will occur
at the lowest rate possible. For example, a hotel with a
restaurant might put each business in a separate entity if
taking advantage of a lower rate on one of those activities
would reduce the total tax.

K. Violates Neutrality
All of these tax minimization strategies, especially economic integration, violate what economists call neutrality.19 Unless a tax is purposely intended to influence
behavior, such as an excise tax on smoking, a tax system
should generate revenue without influencing the decision
making of the market participants. Decisions to consume,
invest, and work should be unaffected by the tax system
to the extent possible.
Turnover taxes have long been recognized as violating
the principle of neutrality.20 These taxes interfere with the
way businesses choose to organize or structure themselves
or interfere with the relative prices of goods.21 If a turnover
tax results in a business engaging in conduct that would
not otherwise have taken place, it will interfere with the
efficient organization and production of goods and services. The result is that the otherwise efficient allocation
of resources is distorted, imposing a dead-weight loss on
the economy. “When taxes distort decisions, the result is
a higher cost of getting goods and services to the public
than would otherwise be necessary and lower potential
living standards for the citizenry than would otherwise
be attainable.”22
Neutrality is also violated if two identical goods compete
with each other but bear different amounts of turnover
Spring 2022

tax. They will bear different amounts of turnover tax
depending on the number of stages of production and
distribution that each went through, and the length of
the supply chain.23

L. The Apportionment Requirement
It is now clear that gross receipts taxes must be apportioned. This mandate by the United State Supreme Court
has generated much litigation.24 Apportionment can be
an especially challenging problem with digital services.

M. Inconsistent with the Policy of
Market-Based Sourcing

Taxing business inputs is an indiscriminate feature of a
turnover tax, which heavily impacts manufacturing in a
state. This aspect works at cross purposes with many state
corporate income taxes, which have moved to marketbased sourcing and single-sales factor apportionment to
encourage in-state manufacturing and other activities.
In other words, corporate income taxes have moved
away from being origin based (payroll and property
factors and the use of costs of performance for situsing
receipts from the sale or leasing of non-tangible personal
property) to being destination based.25 In sharp contrast,
the turnover tax penalizes in-state manufacturing.26
Why would a state worried about investment and job
creation, which then adopts market-based sourcing and
tax incentives as a response, undercut that goal with a
turnover tax?27

N. Distributes the Burden of Taxation
Regressively

To the extent the turnover tax is embedded in the price
of a good or service, the result will be regressive, that
is, the tax will take a smaller percentage of the income
of a person as income increases, contrary to an income
tax with graduated rates that is progressive in its effects.
Consumption declines as a percentage of income as
income increases. Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, or Bill Gates,
for example, cannot possibly consume all of their income.
Low-income persons, by comparison, might not only
consume all their income but might also consume even
more than that by dissaving. Because consumption
declines as income increases, lower-income persons will
pay more turnover tax as a percentage of their income
than will higher-income persons, which constitutes a
regressive pattern.28 But because of cascading, it is difficult to know exactly how the burden is distributed
among individuals and households. This complicates
any attempt to alleviate regressivity through the use of
29
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credits or exemptions in a state’s personal income tax as
is often done to reduce the regressivity of a sales tax.29
(Some evidence exists suggesting that the VAT may not
be as regressive as a sales tax.)30
But it is misleading to talk about the regressivity of a tax
without taking into account the public goods and services
that the tax supports. The regressivity of a tax can be fully
offset by programs the tax finances.

Essentially, a turnover tax is a stealth tax. It is wellnigh impossible to determine (or compare) the tax
burden on various goods because it is a function of
the number of stages that went into their production.
Consumers cannot determine the amount of tax they
are paying if it is embedded in the cost of a purchased
good. Democracy requires informed voters—gross
receipts taxes fail miserably at furthering openness in
government.

III. The Case in Favor of Turnover
Taxes: The Myths

C. Simplicity and Ease of Administration

A. Low Rates
One of the major arguments in favor of a turnover tax is
its low rate.31 The base of a turnover tax is larger than the
base of a sales tax (or VAT). That allows the tax to raise
a targeted revenue objective with a statutory rate lower
than what would be needed by a retail sales tax (or VAT),
making the turnover tax more politically palatable for
those who focus only on the statutory rate.
As discussed above in the context of cascading, focusing
on the statutory rate of a turnover tax is deceptive and
misleading. Because of cascading, the real rate of a turnover
tax—its effective rate—is higher than the illusory statutory
rate. For example, the Washington B&O tax has effective
tax rates that are 250% of the statutory rates.32 Recall that
the now-repealed Indiana turnover tax had effective tax
rates as high as 32%.33 But without sophisticated economic
analysis, the effective tax rate is difficult to determine, and
even if determined, it is invisible to voters. This cascading
is an inherent feature of gross receipts taxes; attempts to
mitigate it introduce complexity and undercut the alleged
simplicity of the tax.

B. The Tax Is Hidden from Voters
Because the actual burden of the tax is hidden, the cost
of government is also hidden. Those who prefer opaqueness in government rather than transparency see this as a
virtue of a turnover tax. “Some politicians might prefer
the freedom to distort made possible by an ill-informed
public, but it is hard to see how that would lead to better
public choices.”34
Those who value honesty and truth in taxation favor
transparency—not opaqueness. “People paying for government services, i.e., taxpayers, ought to have some idea
of what they are paying to inform the political choices
they make as to whether they are receiving value for their
payments.”35
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Another alleged benefit of a turnover tax is that it is
easy to administer. 36 True, before a country’s development would allow for the administration of more
complicated, albeit fairer, levies, a turnover tax might
have been the only option available.37 And how could
it not be easy to administer when a tax administrator
only needs to determine a firm’s gross receipts—or so
it would seem.
By comparison, a retail sales tax also starts with gross
receipts, but then confronts the need to determine and
administer the exemptions whose goal is to eliminate
business inputs from the scope of the tax, as well as
on many items of consumption. Similarly, a corporate
income tax also starts with gross receipts, but then has
the additional complexity of determining applicable
exemptions, deductions, accounting periods, depreciation, attribution rules, apportionment formulas, and so
forth. Does this not underscore the alleged simplicity of
the turnover tax?
No, because the seeming simplicity of the turnover tax
is misleading. The purported simplicity rapidly evaporates with attempts to reduce or eliminate the inherent
defects in the structure of the tax. One example is the
use of multiple rates and classifications to minimize
the cascading of the tax. Moreover, legislators seem to
have difficulty resisting the lobbying of high-volume,
low-profit margin taxpayers, startups, small businesses,
or manufacturers for whom a turnover tax can impose
an undue, and perhaps confiscatory, burden.38 Further,
these taxpayers may complain about their competitive
disadvantage compared to their larger, more established
competitors. These taxpayers demand—and often
receive—preferential rates, deductions, exemptions, or
credits, all intended to reduce the damage caused by
cascading or economic integration. Washington’s B&O
tax,39 or Nevada’s commercial activities tax,40 each having
around 30 classifications, demonstrates how a state can
succumb to these pressures.
As a tax lawyer might appreciate perhaps more than others, each concession adds complexity (and tax planning),
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undercutting the alleged virtues of simplicity and administrability. The need to apportion a turnover tax adds an
additional set of complications. And every provision that
attempts to burnish the defects and rough edges of a
turnover tax complicates it further.
The lack of harmonization dooms attempts at uniformity among the turnover states. The Streamlined Sales
Tax Project deals with uniformity, but only imperfectly
for sales taxes and not at all for turnover taxes. Moreover,
the turnover taxes that have existed for a while abound
with litigation, providing graphic evidence that the putative virtues of simplicity and administrability are naive
and ephemeral.

D. Stability
Some view the base of a turnover tax as more stable than
that of other major taxes. In theory, the broad base of
a gross receipts taxes should help insulate it from the
business cycle. By comparison, during downturns and
recessions, businesses may experience losses and pay no
income taxes. Even worse, they may have loss carryovers,
impacting future budgets. Corporate income taxes can
be volatile, wreaking havoc on budget estimates. Sales tax
revenue can also drop off in business downturns. In contrast, gross receipts taxes are not immediately affected by
business profits, although receipts may decline if demand
drops off during a downturn.
For such an important issue, it is surprising that hardly
any rigorous studies exist. Professor Mikesell is the one
exception. He studied the Washington B&O tax and the
Washington sales tax and compared them with the corporate and personal income taxes in neighboring Oregon,
which does not have a sales tax and at the time of his study
did not have a turnover tax.41 He concluded that the B&O
tax was slightly less stable than Washington’s sales tax, but
more stable than Oregon’s personal and corporate income
taxes. Professor Mikesell concluded that the fluctuations

in the Washington B&O generally tracked that of other
major taxes.42

IV. Conclusion
The purported advantages of low rates, simplicity of
administration, and stability of the tax base are illusionary
but, in any event, are dwarfed by the panoply of defects
identified above. Professor Mikesell, a long-time student
of the field, concluded that the turnover tax “lacks any
link either to capacity to bear the cost of government services or to the amount of government services used—the
normal standards for assigning tax burdens.”43 “There is
no sensible case for gross receipts taxation. The old turnover taxes—typically adopted as desperation measures in
fiscal crisis—were replaced with taxes that created fewer
economic problems. They do not belong in any program
of tax reform.”44
His conclusions have been endorsed by many others.
For example, Professor John Due, who studied turnover
taxes and sales taxes for most of his professional life,
concluded that “[i]n the Latin American countries, and
to some extent even in Europe, the measures taken to
provide a more acceptable pattern of income distribution and to lessen distorting effects have resulted in
almost hopeless complications in rate structures that
have aggravated the problems of operation.”45 In commenting more broadly, he concluded that “these defects
are so serious and lead to so many complaints that the
tax is completely unacceptable as a revenue source for
any country.”46
Ohio in 2005 started the modern round of turnover
taxes, followed by Texas (2008), Nevada (2015), and
Oregon (2019). Hopefully, policymakers who learn of
the abject history of gross receipts/turnover taxes and
their structural defects will be able to resist the myths that
constitute a false siren call.47
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